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Prosecutorial Control in Canada: The Definition 
of Attorney-General in Section 2 of the Criminal 
Code
R. CAMILLE CAMERON*
In 1969, as a result of the redef inition of Attorney-General” in 
section 2 of the Criminal Code, the federal Attorney-General 
assumed an increased role in criminal prosecutions within the 
provinces. This new role has resulted in various challenges to the 
constitutional validity of the amendment — the provinces claim that 
the new definition is an enrroachment upon the administration of 
justice power given to them by section 92(14) of the British North 
America Act while the federal government relies on its criminal law 
power to justify the amendment. The author examines the 1969 
amendment in light of sections 91(27) and 92(14) and analyzes the 
various approaches which Canadian courts have taken in their 
attempts to deal with the problems created by section 2.
Depuis 1969, le procureur général du Canada a exercé un rôle plus 
important en matière de poursuites criminelles dans les limites des 
provinces. Ceci a découlé de la nouvelle définition en 1969 de 
l'expression “procureur général" à l'article 2 du code criminel. En 
1969, se sont ainsi soulevées des contestations sur la constitutionalité 
de la modification. Les provinces prétendent qu’elle constitue un 
empiètement par le gouvernement fédéral sur les pouvoirs quelles 
détiennent en vertu du paragraphe 92(14) de l'Acte de l'Amérique du 
Nord Britannique quant à l'administration de la justice. Le 
gouvernement fédéral, quant à lui, soutient que sa compétei e en 
matière criminelle le justifie d'agir ainsi.
L'étude de l'auteur porte sur la modification de 1969 en tenant 
compte des paragraphes 91(27) et 92(14). Il analyse les différents 
cheminements suivis par les tribunaux canadiens pour aborder ce 
problème.
INTRODUCTION
In any country in which the legislative powers o f the different levels 
o f government are defined in a federal constitution, it is inevitable that 
overlap, conflict and interpretative difficulties will occur as a result of 
this division of power. No where in our constitution is this more obvious 
than in the relationship between ss. 91(27) and 92(14) o f the B.N.A.
*B.A., 1978 (St. Marys). l.L.B. candidate. Faculty of Law, University o f New Brunswick.
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Act. ‘ There is no shortage of cases which comment on the scope o f the 
power given to the federal government to legislate in the area of 
criminal law and procedure; while the cases might be difficult to 
reconcile, one can at least draw upon them to form a tentative definition 
of this federal criminal law power. The same cannot be said of the 
exclusive authority given to the provinces by s. 92(14) to control the 
administration of justice in the province; there is a paucity o f cases in 
this area. This is partly due to the fact that in cases where the question 
has been whether or not an impugned piece of legislation is within the 
scope o f s. 91(27), the alternative provincial head of power has often 
been s. 92(13)2 or s. 92(16).3 Consequently the courts have not been 
called upon to any great extent to interpret s. 92(14).
The amendment to s. 2 of the Criminal Code in 1969,4 giving the 
Attorney-General of Canada the authority to prosecute offences against 
federal statutes other than the Criminal Code,5 especially in light of 
subsequent judicial treatm ent o f the am endm ent,6 has accentuated the 
need for judicial interpretation of s. 92(14). The provinces have 
challenged the amendment on the grounds that s. 92(14) includes the 
exclusive authority of the provincial Attorneys-General to control 
prosecutions o f offences against any statutes deriving their constitutional 
validity from s. 91(27), and have relied on historical and policy 
justifications for this interpretation. The rejoinder o f the federal 
government has been that s. 91(27) embodies the authority to control 
criminal prosecutions as well as to legislate in relation to substantive 
criminal law and procedure.
A satisfactory resolution of this dispute calls for an analysis by the 
courts of the relative scopes of ss. 91(27) and 92(14), but the judicial 
response to the controversy has been disappointing. The courts have 
relied on, and have extended the existing jurisprudence dealing with s. 
91(27), but in the absence of similar precedents defining s. 92(14) they 
have been unwilling to attempt a definition of the latter. Consequently, 
the disposition by our courts o f s. 2 challenges has been confusing, for 
in affirming the constitutionality of the section, which they almost 
inevitably do, the courts have used reasoning which very often defies 
history, precedent and common sense.
The purpose o f this paper is to examine the various ways in which 
the courts have attempted to deal with the numerous constitutional
'30 & 31 Viet., c. 3 (U.K.).
P ro p e rty  and C'.ivil Rights in the Province.
’Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province. 
*Criminal Law Amendment Act, S.C. 1968-69, c. 38, s. 2.
SR.S.C. 1970. c. C-34.
•Notably R v. Hauser et al. (1979), 8 C.R. (3d) 89 (S.C.C.).
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challenges to s. 2 in the decade since its amendm ent and to assess the 
relative contribution which each o f these approaches has made to a 
solution of the question of prosecutorial control raised by this new 
definition o f Attorney-General.
THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE UNDERLYING THE AMENDMENT 
TO SECTION 2
An examination of the reports of the Standing Committee in which 
the proposed amendment to s. 2 was discussed reveals, in the concerns 
expressed by certain committee members, an apprehension that various 
constitutional challenges would result from the am endm ent.7 The 
responses given to their questions by Mr. T urner, then Minister of 
Justice, manifest as much apparent confusion and lack o f understanding 
by the Canadian government of the constitutional issues underlying the 
amendment as was later reflected in the case law dealing with challenges 
to it.
In the committee discussion, Mr. T u rner described the proposed 
amendment as “. . . fairly complicated . . .  it involves the institution of 
criminal proceedings in this country”.8 He dismissed the criticism that 
the proposal was ultra vires because it would allow' the Attorney-General 
o f Canada to move “. . . into the administration o f justice under the 
guise o f amending the Code in the realm o f criminal procedure”9 in the 
following way:
We take the position and  the G overnm ent o f  C anada has always taken the 
position since the Crim inal C ode was enacted in 1892 that the legislative 
jurisdiction, in deciding by whom and u n d e r what circum stances proceedings 
for violations o f  the Crim inal C ode o r crim inal law are  instituted and 
conducted  and d e fended  and term inated  and appealed , is a m atter purely 
relating to  . . . p rocedure  in crim inal m atters as found  within the m eaning o f  
(91(27)).10
In using the words “by whom”, it seems Mr. T urner was unwilling to 
recognize any exclusive provincial authority over Criminal Code 
prosecutions pursuant to the power given to the provinces by s. 92(14). 
This is confirmed by his comments describing the scope of s. 92(14).
[T]he role o f  the provincial attorneys-general in enforcing the Crim inal Code 
derives from  the C rim inal Code itse lf. . . and not from  9 2 (1 4 ) ..  . Head 14 o f
’Minutes o f Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs (March 4, 1969), at 
152. See especially. . .  Mr. Hogarth, who doubted the constitutional validity o f the proposed
amendment and who commented, at 159: "But I look forward to seeing the progress of this particular 
section in the courts.”
•Ibtd., at 152.
*lbtd., at 154. Question of Mr. Hogarth?
10Ibtd.. at 155.
Section 92 is a legislative power to make laws for the adm inistration  o f  justice.
It has no th ing  to do  with the prosecution o f  crim inal law arid 
p ro c e d u re . . .  In o th er words, w hatever is conceded to a provincial 
attorney-general in this statute has been conceded by Parliam ent u n d e r  the 
Ctxle, so that we are not invading any ju risd ic tio n ."
What is obvious from Mr. T u rn er’s analysis o f the relationship 
between ss. 91(27) and 92(14) is his failure to recognize a difference 
between criminal law and procedure on the one hand and criminal 
justice on the other, the former creating crimes and stipulating the 
procedure to be followed in their prosecution and the latter giving the 
provincial Attorneys-General the power to prosecute those crimes 
according to the procedure set out by Parliament in the Code. It is also 
clear from the description given by the Minister o f Justice of the scope 
o f s. 92(14) that any prosecutorial control exercised by the provinces is, 
in his view, the result o f a delegation to the provincial Attorneys-General 
by the Parliament of Canada of a part o f its criminal law power.
Once the position o f the Government o f Canada with regard to the 
scope of its prosecutorial control had been stated the Minister admitted 
there was no explicit statement o f such a power in the Code. That is why 
the amendment to s. 2 was proposed:
[T]o cu re  some gaps in the C rim inal C ode and to place the A ttorney-G eneral 
o f  C anada . . .  on the sam e footing as a provincial attorney general respecting 
those m atters in relation to the prosecution u n d e r federal s ta tu te .12
It is obvious that Mr. T u rn er’s intention o f putting the Attorneys- 
General, federal and provincial, “on the same footing” by codifying what 
in his view was a constitutionally valid practice, federal prosecutorial 
control over federal non-Code offences, could never be achieved given 
his narrow view of s. 92(14). If the power given to the provinces by s. 
92(14) is only “. . . a  legislative power to make laws for the 
administration o f justice. It has nothing to do with the prosecution o f 
criminal law . . ,13 then the provinces have no footing at all in the area o f 
prosecutorial control, let alone an equal footing with the federal 
government.
Further evidence o f the wide interpretation given to s. 91(27) by the 
Government of Canada is evident from Mr. T u rn er’s use o f the Code 
offence of conspiracy as an example of the importance of federal control 
over federal statute prosecutions.14 The use of this example might be 
questioned, since conspiracy is a Criminal Code offence and since the
46 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
"Ibid., at 156.
' ‘Ibid , at 155. 
>3lbid., at 156.
I4/W ., at 154-155.
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justification often given for the amended version o f s. 2 is federal 
prosecutorial control over federal act violations other than the Code15 
While some judges have since 1969 attempted to explain this inclusion in 
s. 2 o f the Code by relying on the inherent executive authority o f a 
legislative body to enforce its statutes,16 it appears the Government of 
Canada had no need to make such an argum ent in 1969. This is 
manifest in the response given by the Minister of Justice to a committee 
member whose concerns for the constitutional validity o f s. 2 led him to 
ask this question:
M r. T u rn e r , you have moved into the Criminal Code when you included 
conspiracy because that is an offence u n d e r the Criminal Code. Why could you 
not move in on  th eft?17
The answer was: “We could.” The Minister then went on to explain the 
view held by the Government of Canada that s. 91(27) included 
prosecutorial power o f all kinds, any deviation from their exclusive 
exercise of such control indicating a delegation by them o f their power. 
Therefore, given his expansive view of s. 91(27) and his concomitant 
restrictive view of s. 92(14), it follows that he would view federal control 
of any criminal prosecution, Code or non-Code, as constitutionally valid.
This position taken by the Government o f Canada on the question 
o f prosecutorial control, as explained by the Minister o f Justice three 
months before the amendm ent to s. 2, presents an interesting contrast to 
the opinion o f the same government, on the identical issue, expressed by 
Mr. T u rner during debate in the House of Commons five months after 
the s. 2 amendm ent received final consent. When Mr. T urner was asked 
by some opposition members whether the Government o f Canada had 
taken any action pursuant to allegations o f criminal activities o f the 
Company of Young Canadians within Quebec, he gave the following 
reply:
[WJhile the  federal governm ent is responsible fo r deciding what action to take 
in respect o f  the m anagem ent and  the fu tu re  o f  the C om pany o f  Young 
C anadians . . . any question o f  institu ting  legal proceedings regard ing  alleged 
violations o f  the C rim inal C ode is, u n d e r the heading o f  the adm inistration o f  
justice, a provincial responsibility.1®
On reiterating this same position, Mr. T urner said any such legal 
proceedings . would . . .  have to be taken"lb by provincial officials.
l5This justification is evident both in Mr. T u rn er’s stated reasons for the proposed amendment (see 
supra, footnote 12) and in the clear language of s. 2: “. . . other than this Act."
'•See, for example R. v. Pelletier (1975), 18 C..C.C. (2d) 516, at 526 (Ont. C.A.), per Estey J.A.
l7Supra, footnote 7, at 155.
“ Debates, House of Commons of Canada, 2nd Session, 28th Parliament, Vol. II, Nov. 24-Dec. 19, 
1131-2207, at 1300, Nov. 27.
'Vbid., at 1301 (emphasis added).
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The m andatory nature of the language clearly rules out any view of 
provincial prosecutorial control as depending on a delegation by the 
federal government of its criminal law power.
One might speculate that the difference in these two conflicting 
views o f the Minister o f Justice lies in his implicit distinction, in the 
House debates, between criminal justice and criminal law and procedure, 
but his failure to formulate a view of s. 92(14)leaves much uncertainty. 
Even if one were to accept this explanation, it does not explain how such 
a sudden change of position could occur between March and November. 
It is submitted that the most realistic explanation, though not the most 
helpful in clarifying s. 2 and the constitutional issues raised by it, is that 
political expediency and necessity can easily result in statements which 
are irreconcilable.
The confusion and contradiction out o f which the amendment to s.
2 became law, as revealed in this search for the legislative intent 
underlying the amendment, has not been dispelled. Since 1969 the issue 
raised in the Committee and House discussions at the time of the 
amendm ent has been dealt with in various ways by Canadian courts. It is 
submitted that all these debates, discussions and decisions are the result 
o f one basic question, a question raised by the amendment to s. 2: Given 
that the provincial Attorneys-General before Confederation exercised 
within their respective boundaries prosecutorial control of criminal 
offences, did the subsequent division o f powers in the B.N.A. Act vest in 
the Attorney-General of Canada exclusive prosecutorial control by virtue 
o f s. 91(27), or did the framers intend to reserve to the provinces their 
control over criminal prosecutions?
PROSECUTORIAL CONTROL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
POWERS IN THE CONSTITUTION
T he definition which one accepts o f either s. 91(27) or s. 92(14) has 
a determinative effect on the degree o f prosecutorial control one 
recognizes in the respective Attorneys-General. An examination of the 
cases dealing with ss. 91(27) and 92(14) sheds some light on the relative 
scope o f these conflicting heads of power.
Section 91(27): The Criminal Law Power
One of the earliest statements of the scope o f the federal criminal 
law power was made in the Hamilton Street Railway case,20 where the Privy 
Council found the Lord’s Day Act,21 ultra vires the Ontario legislature due
laA.G. of Ontario v. Hamilton Street Railway Company, [1903] A.C. 524 (P.C.).
“ R.S.O. 1897, c. 246.
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to the very wide interpretation given to the federal criminal law power. 
They concluded that “. . . the criminal law in its widest sense”22 had been 
reserved to the federal government by s. 91(27), and were willing to 
recognize as the only limitation on this exclusive authority “. . . the 
constitution of the courts o f criminal jurisdiction”.23 While the Privy 
Council did not provide us with a detailed explanation of what “the 
criminal law in its widest sense” entails, that question for the purpose of 
defining ss. 91(27) and 92(14) might be considered moot since the broad 
view of the criminal law power expounded in Hamilton Street Railway 
seems to have been subsequently rejected by the Privy Council.24 The 
comments o f Laskin C.J., speaking for the majority of the Supreme 
Court in R v. Zelensky,2* however, have apparently resuscitated the 
form er test presumed by many to be defunct, and are perhaps an 
indication o f a continued weakening of s. 92(14).
At issue in Zelensky were the compensation and restitution provisions 
of the Criminal Code. In deciding these provisions could be upheld as a 
valid part o f the sentencing process Laskin C.J. rejected26 the test 
articulated by Lord Haldane in the Board of Commerce case, which 
suggested that the federal power over criminal law must be restricted to 
subject m atter which ”. . . by its very nature, belongs to the domain of 
criminal jurisprudence.”27 Such rejection is not surprising, for the Privy 
Council in the P.A.T.A. case had similarly refused to accept the Board of 
Commerce test:
It ap p ears . . .  to be o f  little value to seek to  confine crim es to a category o f  
acts which by th e ir very n a tu re  belong to the dom ain o f  "crim inal 
ju risp ru d en c e ”; for the dom ain o f  crim inal jurisprudence can only be 
ascertained by exam ining what acts at any particular period are declared by 
the  State to  be crim es, and the only com m on na tu re  they will be found to 
possess is that they are  prohibited by the State and that those who commit 
them  are pun ished .28
To hold otherwise and to accept the narrow' view of s. 91(27) stated in 
the Board of Commerce case would effectively preclude the federal 
government from creating new crimes; while there is definite 
disagreement among courts and legal writers as to the limits of the 
criminal law power, most agree that it must include at least the authority 
to create new crimes.
*lSupra, footnote 20, at 529, per Earl o f Halsbury L.C. 
t3lbtd.
i4Propnetary Articles Trade Association v. A.G. of Canada. [1931] A.C. 310 (hereinafter referred to as
P.A.T.A.).
“ (1978), 41 C.C.C. (2d) 97 (S.C.C.).
•Ibtd., at 104.
17Re Board of Commerce Act, 1919, [1922] 1 A.C. 191, at 198-199, per Viscount Haldane L.C. 
ltSupra, footnote 23 at 324.
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What is surprising about the judgm ent of the Chief Justice in Zelensky 
is his reliance on the Hamilton Street Railway case — he recognized that 
the narrow “domain o f criminal jurisprudence” test had been abandoned 
but he did not seem to think that the “criminal law in its widest sense” 
test had met the same fate. Not only did he rely on the test but he 
expanded it to include criminal procedure, something which it is hard to 
accept as being intended by the Privy Council. According to Laskin C.J.:
T h e  Privy Council itself had a d ifferen t view in A.G. Ont. v. Hamilton Street 
Railway . . . where it noted that it was the crim inal law in its widest sense that 
fell within exclusive federal com petence. If  that was tru e  o f  the substantive 
crim inal law, it was equally tru e  o f  “procedure in crim inal m atters”, which is 
likewise confided exclusively to Parliam ent.29
Chief Justice Laskin also relied on Provincial Secretary of P.E.I. v. Egan 
in arriving at a definition of the criminal law power, particularly on that 
court’s inclusion in s. 91(27) o f the authority “. . . t o  create crimes, 
impose punishment for such crimes, and to deal with criminal 
procedure”.30 Given the majority judgment in Zelensky with its reliance 
on the Hamilton Street Railway and Egan cases we can tentatively describe 
the scope o f s. 91(27) as follows: both substantive criminal law and 
procedure in criminal matters, in their widest sense, are confined 
exclusively to the Parliament o f Canada. This authority would include 
creation o f crimes, imposition o f punishments, and the power to deal 
with criminal procedure. The basic question raised by s. 2 and by the 
cases on its constitutional validity is still not answered by this tentative 
definition however, for it does not explain if “the power to deal with 
criminal procedure in its widest sense” gives to the Attorney-General of 
Canada the power to control prosecutions o f criminal offences.
It can be argued that Laskin C.J. imposed a restriction on his 
definition of the criminal lawr power with his recognition that while it 
can properly re-examine decisions on the scope o f legislative power as 
fresh issues are presented to it, the Court must always remember 
“. . . that it is entrusted with a very delicate role in maintaining the 
integrity of the constitutional limits imposed by (the B.N.A. Act).”31 The 
Zelensky decision does not tell us whether or not Laskin C.J. would give 
to s. 92(14) a scope which would limit the federal power to deal with 
criminal procedure and thus exclude the Attorney-General o f Canada 
from the control o f prosecutions relying on s. 91(27) for their 
constitutional validity. His restrictive view of s. 92(14) in Di lorio,32 where 
he would have excluded the provinces from any inquiry into criminality, 
indicates he would not be willing to interpret the administration of
**Sufna, footnote 24. at 1(14.
*•[1941] S.C.R. 396, at 401. 
s 'Supra. footnote 25, at 104.
**Di lono and Fontaine v. Warden of the Common Jail of Montreal (1976), 35 ( .R N.S. 57, at 115 (S.C.C.).
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justice power so as to include control by the provincial Attorneys- 
General over criminal prosecutions. His reliance on Egan and Hamilton 
Street Railway in his Di Iorio dissent is identical to his approach in 
Zelensky, and he was careful to point out in Di Iorio that s. 92(14) was 
qualified to include procedure in civil matters only, not procedure in 
criminal matters.33 Whatever the approach o f Laskin C.J., any decision 
to give to s. 92(14) a restricted meaning in order to accommodate an 
expansive view of s. 91(27) would have to contend with the majority 
decision in Di Iorio which determined that the provincial authority over 
matters relating to the administration of justice includes the 
administration o f criminal justice and the right of the provinces to 
control criminal prosecutions.34
The adoption by the Supreme Court of Canada in Zelensky of the 
broad view of s. 91(27) without a comment from it on whether or not 
this test gives to the federal government prosecutorial control o f 
criminal offences, combined with the expansive view o f s. 92(14) 
adopted by the same court in Di Iorio, does little to clarify the 
relationship between ss. 91(27) and 92(14). Furthermore, recent 
Supreme Court of Canada decisions have upheld provincial legislation 
which would have been struck down if subjected to the wide definition 
given by Laskin C.J. to s. 91(27).35 The Zelensky decision is similar to Di 
Iorio and these other decisions in that the impugned legislation in all 
cases was found intra vires. Several writers have suggested that there is a 
trend toward functional concurrency developing in the Supreme Court 
o f Canada,36 i.e., an attempt to uphold the enactments of both levels o f 
government wherever possible. The operation o f this trend has been 
described in the following way:
Permissive attitudes tow ards provincial legislation, possibly susceptible o f  
classification in whole o r  in part as in relation to crim inal law seem evident, 
particularly in fields where the  provinces have some plausible title to 
intervene, and in which provincial coverage has become fairly com prehensive.
In the result, a m ovem ent o r  tren d  tow ards a functional concurrency in the 
crim inal law field seems to  be occurring .37
i4lbid. at 113-115.
**lbtd, at 83 per Dickson J.; at 94 per Beetz J.
“ See, for example. A.G. of Quebec (J Keable v. A.G. of Canada, [1979] I S.C.R. 218; A.G. of Canada v. 
Dupond (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 420 (S.C.C.); Faber v. The Queen (1976), 65 D.L.R. (3d) 423 (S.C.C.).
” l.eigh, L.M., "The Criminal Law Power: A Move Towards Functional Concurrency?", (1967) 5 Alta. 
Law Rev. 237, at 250, 252-3; MacPherson, J.C., "The Constitutionality o f the Com pen sat ion and 
Restitution Provisions o f  the Criminal Code — The Picture After Regina v. Zelensky”, (1979) 11 Ottawa 
Law Rev. 713, at 730-2.
37Leigh, supra, footnote 36, at 252.
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Another writer has more recently confirmed this trend:
T hus, in the crim inal law area, s. 91(27) has not proved useful as a shield 
against provincial legislation. But that fact does no thing to deny the strength  
o f  s. 91(27) as an effective sword in the  federal hand , one which the courts 
seldom stay.38
This statement seems to be the only way to reconcile the recent cases in 
which ss. 91(27) and 92(14) have been in question, but it does not 
provide us with a very satisfactory answer to the question of 
prosecutorial control raised by s. 2. If it is true that because of the trend 
toward functional concurrency, “[i]t is unlikely that a Criminal Code 
provision would be struck down by the court as being outside 
Parliament's criminal law power”,39 then the fears expressed by Dickson 
J. in Hauser with regard to concurrency are well-founded.40 L^eigh 
states41 that restricted use o f both the repugnancy and the paramountcy 
doctrines is an essential part of the functional concurrency principle, but 
it must be noted that utilization o f the concurrency doctrine necessarily 
results in conflicts between the legislative powers in question being 
resolved in favor of the federal government. Since it is obvious that s. 2 
does give rise to conflicts between the federal and provincial 
Attorneys-General,
. . . [t]he result o f  declaring  concurren t jurisdiction is, so fa r as the office o f  
provincial a ttorney-general is concerned in relation to prosecution o f  crim inal 
offences, the same as a declaration o f  exclusive federal power. W hether one 
speaks in term s o f  federal pow er o r  o f  concurrency, the provincial power, 
being subservient, m ust give way. T h e re  can never be two attorneys-general in 
respect o f  the same proceeding. Acceptance o f  the notion o f  concurrency 
would have the effect o f  rem oving from  the provincial a ttorney-general the 
prim ary right and  duty  to prosecute in the province.42
In spite o f the various policy reasons which can be cited to justify 
ultimate federal prosecutorial control o f criminal and non-criminal 
legislation,43, for instance the desirability of uniformity and the 
increasingly national scope of many offences, there are also policy 
reasons which justify provincial control of criminal prosecutions.44 These 
would include the local nature of much crime and the greater 
accountability in the provinces o f the respective provincial Attorneys-
3BMacPherson, supra, f<x>tnote 36, at 731.
3*lbul.. at 732.
t0R. v. Hauser et al., supra, footnote 6, at 126-7.
*'Supra, footnote 36, at 250, 253.
41R. v. Hauser et al., supra, footnote 6, at 126, per Dickson J.
°See, e.g. MacPherson, J.C., "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1078-79 T erm ”, (1980) 1 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 77. at 99-103.
44See, e.g. Taman, Larry, "Hauser and Control over Criminal Prosecutions in Canada", (1980) 1 Sup. Ct.
¡mw Rev. 401, at 413-15.
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General. More convincing than policy reasons is the argum ent that s. 
92(14) o f the B.N.A. Act gives the provinces exclusive authority to 
prosecute criminal offences, and to employ the functional concurrency 
doctrine is to ignore the obvious division of jurisdiction in criminal 
matters envisaged by the constitution. While there has not been a great 
deal of judicial interpretation of s. 92(14), some o f the cases that have 
dealt with that head of power should be examined in an attempt to 
determine the validity of the provincial claims to prosecutorial control.
Section 92(14): The Administration of Justice in the Province45
The decision o f the Supreme Court of Canada in Di Iorio, where the 
Court upheld provincial legislation establishing an inquiry into organized 
crime within the province, is one o f the few cases in which a thorough 
explanation was attempted o f the power enjoyed by the provinces 
pursuant to s. 92(14) and o f the relationship between that section and s. 
91(27). In relying on the function o f the inquiry in question to justify 
provincial authority to conduct it, Dickson J. stated that since the 
impugned legislation establishing the inquiry made no attempt to alter 
criminal procedure, to create new crimes or to alter old ones, it was not 
an encroachment by the provinces on the criminal law power of the 
federal government but was a valid exercise o f the power of the 
provinces to administer justice within their respective boundaries.46 
According to Dickson J. then, the criminal law power encompasses a 
determination of what activities are criminal and of what procedure is to 
be followed in the courts to enforce this criminal law. He was careful 
however, to distinguish between criminal procedure and criminal law on 
the one hand, and criminal justice on the other:
[T]he phrase “crim inal p rocedure" as used in the B.N.A. Act cannot d ra in
from  the words "A dm inistration o f  Justice" in s. 92(14) that which gives
those words m uch o f  th e ir substance —  the elem ent o f  “crim inal justice”.47
Dickson J. considered both “criminal investigation and prosecutions”4* 
and “the ferreting out o f crime and identification o f criminals”49 as 
powers encompassed by the element of criminal justice in s. 92(14). Only 
if the provinces in attempting to administer criminal justice were to 
encroach upon the authority o f the federal government to create and
4*The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and 
Organization o f Provincial Courts, both o f Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure 
in Civil Matters in these Courts.
**Supra, footnote 32, at 76.
471 bid., at 83.
“ Ibid., at 80.
"Ibid., at 89.
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alter crimes and to stipulate the procedure to be followed in prosecuting 
these crimes (such procedure, it should be emphasized, not including 
control over the actual prosecution of the crime) would they have 
exceeded the jurisdiction given t them by s. 92(14).
Beetz J. was in agreement with the need to differentiate criminal 
justice from criminal law and procedure. He relied upon the situation 
which prevailed before Confederation in reaching his decision as to the 
present relationship o f ss. 91(27) and 92(14), stating:
It was contem plated  by s. 91(27) o f  the B.N.A. Act that crim inal law, 
substantive and procedural, would come u n d e r the exclusive legislative 
authority  o f  the Parliam ent o f  C anada. But subject to this provision and to 
the param ountcy o f  federal law enacted u n d e r prim ary o r ancillary federal 
jurisd iction , the provinces were to rem ain responsible in principle for the 
enforcem ent o f  crim inal law and to retain  such pow er as they had before with 
respect to the adm inistration o f  crim inal justice. T hey continued in fact . . .  to 
investigate crim e, (and) . . .  to prosecute crim inals . . .  50
He found support for his position in Attorney-General of Quebec v. 
Attorney-General of Canada where Taschereau J. defined the power given 
to the federal government by s. 91(27) as “. . . the power to determine 
what shall or what shall not be ‘criminal’, and to determine the steps to 
be taken in prosecutions and other criminal proceedings before the 
courts.”51 Based on Di Iorio, then, the questions of the procedure to be 
followed and which Attorney-General will prosecute are not the same: to 
hold otherwise would be to ignore the historical context in which the 
divided jurisdictions o f ss. 91(27) and 92(14) were drafted.
There are other cases which affirm this broad view of the 
administration o f justice in the province adopted by the majority in Di 
Iorio. In/?, v. St. Louis, Wurtele J. held that:
As the conduct o r supervision o f crim inal prosecutions before the crim inal 
courts devolves upon the provincial law officers, the A ttorney-G eneral o f 
C anada has no m inisterial duties o r official legal functions to perform  in that 
connection . . . 52
Similarly, in Re Public Inquiries Act s. 92(14) was held to include the 
taking of “requisite steps in court to prosecute persons accused o f 
crime.”53 The court in R. v. Yuhasz attributed to the provincial 
Attorney-General the primary right to appear in any criminal 
proceeding at any stage and doubted “the constitutionality o f any federal 
legislation that might attempt to exclude him”.54
stlbid.. at 94. The reference o f Beetz J. to the paramountcy of federal laws, it can be argued, puts a
restriction on s. 92(14) not imposed by the analysis of Dic kson ).
s,[ 1945J S.C.R. 600, at 603.
” (1898), 1 C.C.C. 141. at 145-146 (Que. Q.B.).
” (1919), 48 D.L.R. 237. at 239-240 (B.C. C.A.).
5<( 1961), 128 C.C.C. 172, at 178-179 (Ont C.A.).
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In spite o f these authorities, the recent decisions upholding the 
constitutionality o f  s. 2 m ust be contended with, and it is hard to 
reconcile the broad in terpretation o f  s. 92(14) found in Di Iorio with 
them . Is it because the Canadian courts are convinced that the 
jurisdiction o f s. 92(14) was in tended by the fram ers o f the B.N.A. Act to 
be construed narrowly enough to exclude provincial prosecutorial 
control over criminal offences that they have consistently found  s. 2 intra 
vires? O n the contrary, the diligence with which the courts have avoided 
characterizing legislation as deriving its constitutionality from  the federal 
crim inal law power in cases where a s. 2 challenge is the issue indicates 
an awareness on the part o f these courts that s. 2 m ight have to be 
found invalid once it is held to give to the federal governm ent 
prosecutorial control over criminal offences. T his opinion is substan­
tiated not only by the present trend  o f the Suprem e C ourt o f Canada to 
uphold legislation w henever possible,55 but also by a study o f  some o f 
the cases in which the courts have addressed themselves to the 
constitutional validity o f s. 2. W hat will become evident from  the 
following exam ination o f such cases is the variety o f approaches which 
the courts have adopted  in finding s. 2 intra vires w ithout any significant 
com m ent on s. 92(14), and consequently without any solution to what 
the provinces consider to be the main problem  created by s. 2: the dual 
prosecutorial role in crim inal m atters.
THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION2: JUDICIAL TRENDS 
The Broad View of Section 91(27)
O ne way to resolve, o r avoid, the constitutional questions raised by s.
2 is to reject the distinction m ade in Di Iorio between crim inal procedure 
and crim inal justice. Such a rejection gives prosecutorial control to the 
federal governm ent.
In the recent case o f R. v. Hoffman LaRoche Ltd. 56 the question 
before the O ntario  High C ourt was the constitutional authority  o f the 
A ttorney-General o f  C anada to p refer an indictm ent and conduct the 
prosecution for an offence u n d er the Combines Investigation Act. 57 
Counsel for the accused relied on the distinction between criminal law 
and procedure, and crim inal justice in arguing that the institution and 
control o f these crim inal proceedings was within the exclusive control o f 
the Attorney-G eneral o f the province pursuant to the provincial power 
to adm inister crim inal justice in the province. He contended, in 
analyzing the relationship o f ss. 91(27) and 92(14), that
••( 1980), 28 O.R. (2d) 164 (Ont. H.C.).
"R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23.
S5See supra, footnotes 36-41.
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[t]he criminal law power as set out in s. 91(27) covered the substantive issues, 
which he described as the “what” . .  . Criminal procedure as set out in 91(27) 
embraced the rules o f  the game, what he considered to be the “how”, . . . (he 
distinguished), however the “what" and the “how" from the “who", which he 
suggests includes rules relating to the players in the proceedings, that is,
“who” institutes the proceedings and “who” conducts them. These matters, he 
says, are neither criminal law nor criminal procedure, but fall within the 
"Administration o f  Justice", pursuant to s. 92(14) and, consequently, are 
under the exclusive authority o f  the various provinc ial Attorneys-General.58
T h e  C ourt considered the analysis an ingenious one, but refused to 
accept it. L inden J. was willing to  recognize that a certain am ount o f 
overlap necessarily results from the existence o f  ss. 91(27) and  92(14), 
and  that ju risd iction  to enforce federal laws . . from  one 
a sp e c t. . . may be viewed as w ithin the adm inistration o f  justice in the 
province u n d er s. 92(14).”59 While reliance on the double aspect 
doctrine is also evident in the judgm ent o f  Dickson J . in Di Iorio,eo the 
two judgm ents d iffer in that Linden J. views the actual prosecution o f 
crim inal offences as subject to this double aspect doctrine and 
consequently subject also to the concurrent jurisdictions o f both levels o f  
governm ent. He then goes one step fu rth e r to rely upon the doctrine o f 
param ountcy, effectively stripping the provinces o f  any control over 
crim inal prosecutions where there is an inconsistency between federal 
and provincial views. Dickson J ., on the o ther hand, relying on historical 
evidence as well as on his threefold division o f criminal m atters (law, 
procedure and justice) put the enforcem ent o f  criminal laws within the 
exclusive sphere o f the provinces pursuant to the power gran ted  to them 
by s. 92( 14).
T h e  decision in Hoffman LaRoche indicates the effect which 
acceptance o f  the broad view o f  s. 91(27) has on the disposition o f 
challenges to s. 2. If  the prosecution o f  offences against federal acts 
o th er than the Criminal Code is included within the federal criminal law 
power, then the constitutional validity o f an enactm ent o f the Parliament 
o f  C anada giving to the federal A ttorney-General such prosecutorial 
power cannot be disputed.
Characterization of Legislation
Characterization and Section 2
In addition to the wide view o f s. 91(27) and the accom panying 
rejection of a separation between criminal justice and  crim inal law and 
procedure, courts have also relied upon dubious characterization o f 
legislation in dealing with the question o f  prosecutorial control. Perhaps
^  Supra, footnote 56. at 184.
"Ibid
*°Supra, footnote 32, at 81-82.
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the most notable exam ple o f  such an approach is the use o f the federal 
residual power in Hauser to characterize narcotics legislation.61 T he 
effect o f such characterization is to rem ove the im pugned legislation 
from  the purview o f the federal crim inal law power, thereby avoiding a 
determ ination o f  w hether o r not s. 2 is an encroachm ent upon the 
exclusive authority  o f  the provinces to enforce crim inal justice pursuant 
to s. 92(14).
T h e  judgm ents in R. v. Walden62 and R. v. Parrot63 present at best a 
novel approach to the constitutional problem s raised by s. 2 and are at 
worst a fu rth e r exam ple o f  an evasion o f  these problem s by Canadian 
courts. In both cases the accused union leaders had been charged un d er 
s. 115(1)64 o f the Criminal Code with failure to obey an Act o f  Parliam ent, 
by contravening s. 3(1) o f  the Postal Services Continuation Act. 65 T he 
A ttorney-General o f  C anada had p re ferred  the indictm ents in both 
cases, and his jurisdiction to do so was the basic issue in the appeals.
In Walden the challenge was twofold. First, counsel for the accused 
argued  that s. 115(2), which gave the A ttorney-G eneral o f  C anada his 
authority, was ultra vires in that it encroached upon the powers o f the 
provinces with respect to the adm inistration o f  justice. T h e  reliance o f 
the court on Hauser, which had been decided only one week before, 
made it unnecessary for the court to deal with this contention in any 
detail.66 M urray J. was able to dispose o f  the constitutional challenge to 
s. 115(2) by following the judgm ent o f  Pigeon J ., whose decision, in 
tu rn , had been facilitated by the concessions o f  O ntario , Q uebec and 
British Columbia in the Hauser appeal that the federal governm ent 
enjoys exclusive authority  to prosecute violations o f  o r conspiracies to 
violate federal acts . . which do not depend  for their constitutional 
validity on head 27 o f s. 9 1”.67 Pigeon J. went one step fu r th e r and 
reached what he considered to be a solution to the constitutional
*'Supra, footnote 5, at 106-109.
**(1979), 8 C.R (3d) 255 (B.C.S.C.).
“ (1979). 51 C.C.C. (2d) 539 (Ont. C.A.).
**S. I 15(1): Everyone who, without lawful excuse contravenes an Ai t ot the Parliament of Canada by 
wilfully doing anything that it forbids or by wilfully omitting to do anything that it requires to be done 
is . . . guilty of an indictable offence . . . .
S. 115(2): Any prcxeedings in respect of a contravention of or conspiracy to contravene an Ait 
mentioned in subsection (1), other than this Act. may be instituted at the instance o f the Government of 
Canada and conducted by or on behalf of that Government.
“ S.C. 1978-79, c. 1. The contraventions consisted o f not informing union members that any strike 
engaged in after the coming into force o f the Act would be illegal.
*5Supra, footnote 62, at 258-259.
**Supra, footnote 6, at 105.
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challenge to s. 2 by characterizing the Narcotic Control Act68 un d er the 
federal residual power ra th er than u n d er the criminal law' power.69 This 
decision has become an un fo rtunate  precedent, one which has ham pered 
the developm ent o f a clear understand ing  o f the relationship between 
prosecutorial control and the adm inistration o f justice in the province. A 
b rie f look at the judicial in terpretation o f  the Narcotic Control Act seems 
to indicate that the peace, o rd e r and good governm ent characterization 
arrived at by Pigeon J. was not supported  by precedent.
In 1971 the Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada stated that the Narcotic 
Control Act was truly crim inal legislation.70 In R. v. Pontbriand, the 
Q uebec Superior C ourt re ferred  to the same Act as having been passed 
by Parliam ent exclusively u n d er its crim inal law power, with . . no 
independen t federal constitutional u n d erp inn ing”71 apart from s. 91(27). 
An exam ination o f  the Pelletier72 and Collins73 cases, both dealing 
with charges un d er the Narcotic Control Act, seems also to indicate an 
acceptance by the courts o f  the characterization o f narcotics control 
legislation as crim inal law.74 T h e  earlier Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada 
decision in I.A.C. v. The Queen75 was also an affirm ation o f the criminal 
natu re  o f  narcotics legislation. Pigeon attem pted, in Hauser, to distinguish 
this decision on the g rounds that the m atter was obiter in the I.A.C. case 
and that the appellants had conceded the crim inal natu re o f the 
legislation in a rg u m en t.76 T his is a tenuous distinction, as the clear 
language used by the court in the I.A.C. case puts the criminal natu re o f 
narcotics control legislation beyond d ispu te .77 O ne m ight note at this 
point the following concession m ade by the A ttorney-General o f  Canada 
in the Hauser appeal: “[i]t has already been held by this C ourt in I.A.C. 
v. The Queen . . . that the Act is within the scope o f s. 91(27).”78
A consideration o f  the history o f  narcotics control legislation in 
C anada renders even m ore untenable the argum ent o f Pigeon J. that
"R.S.C. 1970, c. N -l.
**Supra, footnote 6. at 109.
70R. v. P ure ' Fisheries Ltd., [1971] S.C.R. 5, at 17.
Tl(1978), 39 C.C.C. (2d) 145, at 152.
7 Vi. v Pelletier supra, footnote 16.
73K. v. Collins (1972), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 52 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
74See Elliot, Robin. “Constitutional Law - Federal Prosecutions - narcotic Control Act - Criminal Code, s.
2- R. v. Hauser", (1979) 14 U.B.C. Law Rev. 163, at 167: “Certainly there is no indication in the 
judgments that the Narcotu: Control Act could be characterized in any other manner."
7ilndustnal Acceptance Corp. v. The Queen, [19531 4 H.I..R. 369.
7*Supra, footnote 6, at 106.
17Supra, footnote 75, at 372, 374.
7*Elliot, supra, f<K)tnote 74, at 177.
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this legislation can be justified u n d er the federal residual pow er because 
it deals with a genuinely new problem . D rug addiction has been a 
problem  in Canada for at least 120 years,79 and even if this were not so 
the definitions given to the criminal law power by the Suprem e C ourt o f  
C anada in the Zelensky case80 and by the Privy Council in the P.A.T.A. case 
indicate that this power . . is wide, and may cover activities which have 
not h itherto  been considered to be crim inal.”81 Yet Pigeon J. gave little 
weight to either the historical factors o r previous case law in arriving at 
his decision. Consequently, he was able to use the peace, o rd e r and good 
governm ent clause to avoid an in terpretation o f the scope o f s. 92(14), 
especially the criminal justice elem ent of that head o f power and its 
effect on prosecutorial control in Canada.
If  Pigeon J. can be questioned for his classification o f the Narcotic 
Control Act u n d er a federal power o ther than s. 91(27), application o f  his 
crim inal/non-crim inal analysis by M urray J . to the facts o f  the Walden 
case is even less tenable. Faced with a challenge to s. 115 o f the Code, 
and  specifically to the prosecutorial authority o f the Attorney-General o f  
C anada, M urray J. drew  the conclusion that s. 115 was not necessarily 
crim inal law’ just because it was contained within the Code. Such a view 
is not only contrary to com m on sense but is contradicted by the 
com plete title o f the Criminal Code: viz. An Act Respecting the Criminal Law. 
Pigeon J. had reached his conclusion as to the nature o f  the Narcotic 
Control Act by recognizing that penalties by themselves do not stam p out 
a piece o f legislation as crim inal.82 He used the exam ple o f revenue acts, 
which are not classified as criminal law but which contain severe 
penalties for their breach. M urray J. paraphrased these com m ents and 
drew  an analogy to this case in the following way:
. . .  I do not consider that the mere fact that a maximum penalty o f  
imprisonment for two years, as provided for in s. 115, stamps out that section 
as criminal law per se, nor, in my view, does the mere fact that the legislation 
appears in the Criminal Code so stamp it.83
If  one accepts for the sake o f argum ent that the com m ents o f 
Pigeon J. concerning penalties are correct, one can see the rationale in 
the first part o f  the above com m ents o f  M urray J. with regard  to s. 1 15. 
It is in trying to grasp the second part o f  his statem ent, that merely 
because a piece o f  legislation is in the Code does not m ean it is criminal 
law, that difficult conceptual problem s arise. One cannot help but 
w onder why the Parliam ent o f C anada would put som ething in the
7'See Trasov, G.E. "History o f the Opium and Narcotic Drug Legislation in Canada", (1961-62) 4 Cnm. 
L.J 274, at 275. See also Dickson, J. in Hauser, supra, footnote 6, at 152-158.
*°Supra, footnote 25.
"P .A .T .A ., supra, footnote 24. at 323.
**Supra, footnote 6, at 108.
lsSupra, footnote 62, at 259.
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Criminal Code which is not criminal law. If  Parliam ent can impose 
penalties for violations o f  federal legislation without m aking the 
legislation criminal, can they also put such penalty charging sections in 
the Criminal Code and still avoid a classification o f such sections as 
crim inal law? T h e  revenue acts relied upon by Pigeon J. in m aking his 
argum ent em body the penalty for their breach; it is quite a d ifferent 
m atter to use a penalty in the Criminal Code as a charging section for a 
violation o f a non-Code federal act. It is because s. 115(2) falls in the 
latter category that the analogy drawn by M urray J . between the 
characterization by Pigeon J. o f  narcotics control legislation and s. 115(2) 
is defective.
T he second objection o f  counsel for the accused in Walden was 
based on the adoption in Hauser o f  the judgm ent o f  the Quebec C ourt 
o f  Appeal in R. v. M iller84 wherein it was held that the A ttorney-General 
o f  Canada does not have the authority  to prosecute a violation o f a Code 
section.85 Since W alden was charged u n d er s. 115, it was argued the 
A ttorney-G eneral o f C anada and  no authority to p refer an indictment. 
This would be a valid argum ent in spite o f the previous finding o f 
M urray J. that s. 115(2) was not criminal law, for the distinction m ade in 
Miller was C ode/non-C ode and not crim inal/non-crim inal. Yet M urray J. 
dismissed the challenge by relying on the absence o f  a section similar to 
s. 1 15(2) in the charging section86 at issue in Miller, saying
. . .  if the definition o f  the words “Attorney General" had been modified (in 
Miller) by a section or subsection equivalent to s. 115(2), the interpretation 
given to those words in the M iller case would have been entirely different. In 
my view, all that s. 115(2) does is to create a further proper and logical 
exception to the definition o f  “Attorney General” contained in s. 2 o f  the 
Criminal Code. 87
While this distinction m ight have been the only one available to M urray 
J. which would enable him to reconcile his reliance on Hauser with its 
acceptance o f Miller, it does not withstand scrutiny. Since both ss. 2 and
1 15(2) give the A ttorney-G eneral o f  C anada a role in proceedings where 
there is a violation o f o r conspiracy to violate any act o f  the Parliam ent 
o f  C anada o ther than the Criminal Code it is difficult to see how s. 115 is 
in any way a m odification o f  s. 2.
I'he issues dealt with by the court in R. v. Parrot88 were similar to 
those raised in Walden as was the disposition o f those issues. Counsel for
**Regina v. Miller (1975), 27 C.C.C. (2d) 438 (Que. C.A.) (leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused May 5, 
1975). See Pigeon J. in Hauser, supra, footnote 6, at 100: "As to the interpretation o f the definition of 
“Attorney General", I see no reason to disagree with the view taken bv the Quebec Court of Appeal in 
Miller v. R. . . . ”
8iIbid., at 446-447.
**S. 169 (f). Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-3. 
t7Supra, footnote 62, at 260.
“*Supra., footnote 62 .
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the accused assumed that Parliam ent had determ ined the conduct 
proscribed in s. 115 to be crim inal in natu re by the very fact that it was 
pu t in the Criminal Code. T h e  court disagreed, accepting instead the 
a rgum ent o f  the Crown that s. 115 did not depend  on the criminal law 
power for its validity, because it was related to o ther com petent federal 
legislation, the Postal Services Continuation Act.89 This decision was 
reached only after an acknowledgem ent by the court that Hauser had 
firmly established the constitutional validity o f  s. 2 to the extent that it 
gives authority  to the A ttorney-G eneral o f  C anada to  control 
prosecutions o f federal non-criminal offences. T h e  convenient conclu­
sion reached by the court based on Hauser was that s. 115 was not 
crim inal ju st because it was in the Code. T h e  court adopted, at least 
implicitly, the reasoning used by Pigeon J. in his characterization o f  the 
Narcotics Control Act, stating that the Postal Services Continuation Act had 
been enacted “. . . to m eet what was clearly . . .  an im m ediate urgent 
national problem  . . . ”90 T h e  exclusive power o f the federal governm ent 
pursuant to  s. 91(5) o f the B.N.A. Act over postal services was also relied 
upon. In this way the question o f  w hether o r not it is within the power 
o f  the A ttorney-G eneral o f C anada to control a prosecution for a 
crim inal offense was again avoided, no criminal offence having been 
found.
N either Parrot nor Walden gives any satisfactory explanation for the 
am endm ent o f  s. 115 in 1975 to include s. 115(2). It seems that s. 2 is 
identical to s. 115(2) in giving to the A ttorney-General o f  Canada 
(questions o f  constitutional validity aside) the power to control the 
prosecution for a breach o f any federal non-Code act. T hese cases, and 
Hauser do indicate that the courts in attem pting to uphold s. 2 have been 
forced to avoid classifying legislation as criminal in situations where s. 2 
is challenged by provinces as an encroachm ent upon s. 92(14). T his 
evasion o f the constitutional problem  presented by s. 2 has m anifested 
itself in at least two questionable solutions: the characterization o f the 
Narcotic Control Act u n d er the federal residual power instead o f  u n d er s. 
91(27), notw ithstanding overwhelm ing authority  to the contrary, and an 
even m ore spurious decision that not all provisions o f  the Criminal Code 
are necessarily enacted un d er the criminal law power o f  the Parliam ent o f 
Canada.
Characterization: Some Recent Cases
In addition to the h indering  effect which such characterization o f  
legislation has had on the developm ent o f an understand ing  o f  the scope 
o f  s. 92(14) and its relation to s. 91(27), and o f the respective 
prosecutorial powers o f the federal and provincial Attorneys-General, 
o ther problem s have resulted. T h e  decision o f the British Columbia
**Supra, footnote 64.
90Supra, footnote 62, at 552.
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Suprem e C ourt in Schneider v. The Queen in Right of British Columbia91 
illustrates what one w riter has re ferred  to as the most obvious 
consequence o f  the majority decision in Hauser: the inability o f  the 
provinces to deal with the d ru g  problem .92 In this case the Heroin 
Treatment Act,9̂  which provided for com pulsory treatm ent o f  persons 
addicted to certain narcotics, was found  ultra vires the provincial 
Legislature. While this case has been recently overturned  on appeal,94 a 
com parison o f  the two judgm ents indicates the havoc which strict 
adherence to Hauser can wreak on the division o f  legislative powers in 
the constitution. Such adherence effectively precludes any characteriza­
tion o f narcotics legislation u n d er a head o f  power o ther than the 
federal residual power.
T he  decision o f the B.C. Suprem e C ourt is based on such an 
adherence to Hauser and a concom itant unwillingness to consider any 
alternate characterization o f narcotics legislation. Having decided that 
the subject m atter o f  the im pugned legislation was narcotics, M cEachern 
C.J. stated: “I am com m anded by the Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada to deal 
with the subject-m atter o f  the Narcotic Control Act on the same footing as 
such o ther new developm ents as aviation and radio  com m unication.”95 
I'he im pugned legislation was therefore justified u n d er the federal 
residual power, and was held to be outside the legislative com petence o f 
the province.96 T h e  C ourt o f Appeal, on the o th er hand, was able to 
avoid such a result w ithout disagreeing with Hauser by finding that the 
subject m atter o f the Heroin Treatment Act was in relation to ss. 92(7),97 
(13)98 and (16),99 having as its chief purpose the establishm ent o f 
facilities “. . . for the purpose o f  term inating  o r dim inishing use o f  o r 
dependency on narcotics . . .”.100 Such a characterization is preferable to 
those found in Hauser, Parrot and Walden.
• ‘(1979), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (B.C.S.C.).
®!Elliot, supra, footnote 74, at 200.
•»S.B.C. 1978, c. 24. [R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 166.]
•«(1980). 52 C.C.C. (2d) 321 (B.C.C.A.).
9’‘Supra, footnote 91, at 155.
**A somewhat confusing aspect ol the lower court judgment was its rinding, at 175-176, that the Hrrom  
Treatment Act was, alternatively, justifiable under s. 91(27). It is inconsistent to rely on the majority 
decision in Hauser to support the proposition that provincial legislation is ultra vires because its subject 
matter falls within the federal residual power, then to say the same piece o f legislation is also ultra vires 
because it is in pith and substance criminal law, since the purpose of the introductory clause of s. 91 
“. .  . is to accommodate the matters which do not come within any o f the enumerated federal or 
provincial heads." See Hogg, Constitutional Law o f Canada, at 246.
•rThe Establishment, Maintenance and Management o f Hospitals. Asylums, Charities . . .  in and for the 
provinces.
•“Property and Civil Rights in the Province.
•'Generally all Matters o f a Local or Private Nature.
'00Supra, footnote 94. at 330.
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T h e  C ourt o f Appeal was not faced in the Schneider case with the 
issue o f  the constitutional validity o f s. 2. Its willingness to characterize 
the subject m atter as being within provincial com petence in spite o f  the 
strong precedent set by Hauser raises the hope that fu tu re  courts called 
upon to deal with a challenge to the power o f the federal 
A ttorney-G eneral to control the prosecution o f an offence which should 
properly be nharacterized as crim inal {e.g., a s. 423 conspiracy to violate 
the Narcotic Control Act), will take a similar approach. This, in tu rn , might 
provide the m uch needed judicial in terpretation  o f  s. 92(14).
Such an approach is evident in R. v. Kripps Pharmacy L td .,101 wherein 
the court was faced with a prosecution conducted by the Attorney- 
G eneral o f  C anada for offences against the Food and Drugs A ct,102 the 
accused having sold new drugs without first filing the m anufactu rer’s 
nam e as required  by the Act. In recognizing . . the overrid ing 
authority  o f  the provinces u n d er s. 92(14)”103 in the enforcem ent o f the 
crim inal law, W etm ore Co. Ct. J. adopted the dissenting ju d g m en t o f 
Dickson J . in Hauser as well as the reasoning in Di Iorio to conclude that 
the exclusive authority  to control the prosecution o f crim inal offences is 
within the power o f  adm inistration o f justice. T herefo re , s. 2 was found 
ultra vires to the extent that it vested power in the federal 
A ttorney-G eneral to control the adm inistration o f  crim inal justice, 
including prosecutions, in the province.
T h e  conclusions o f  Kripps and Di Iorio affirm  the exclusive 
prosecutorial role o f  provincial A ttorneys-General with regard to 
crim inal offences. We have seen however, that courts have utilized 
various approaches in disposing o f  s. 2 challenges which m anage to 
avoid such an affirm ation. T h e  application o f the doctrine o f 
concurrency is an exam ple o f such an approach.
Concurrency
In R. v. M iller104 the accused had been charged with intent to 
defrau d  contrary to s. 350(a)(ii) o f  the Criminal Code and with two 
offences contrary to the federal Bankruptcy A ct.l0i T he  A ttorney-General 
o f  C anada had p re ferred  both indictm ents and 'h e  accused contended 
that the language o f  s. 2 was clear in exem pting from  the power o f the 
A ttorney-G eneral o f  C anada the control o f prosecutions o f  Criminal Code
I01(I980), 14 C.R. (3d) »55 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
I0,R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27.
l03Supro, footnote 101, at 377.
,0iSufna. footnote 84.
105 Supra, footnote 86.
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offences. It was also contended that s. 2 was ultra vires to the extent that 
it gave the federal govenm ent the power to prosecute non-Code 
offences, since such prosecutorial control was vested in the provinces by 
vitrue o f  s. 92(14). T h e  court decided that the indictm ent p re ferred  by 
the Attorney-General o f C anada for the s. 350 offence was a nullity, 
since the language o f s. 2 clearly reserves to the provincial 
A ttorneys-General prosecution o f  Code offences.106 With regard  to the 
prosecution o f offences u n d er federal Acts o ther than the Criminal Code, 
the court found that s. 2 created concurren t power in both levels o f 
governm ent.107
Lajoie J.A . was able to find concurrency by reading the second part 
o f  s. 2, giving to the federal A ttorney-General the power to prosecute 
federal non-C ode offences, as inclusive not exclusive. In o ther words, 
A ttorney-G eneral means the A ttorney-G eneral o f a province and m eans 
also, with respect to the Northwest T erritories, the Yukon and 
proceedings in relation to a violation o f  o r a conspiracy to violate a 
federal act, the A ttorney-G eneral o f  C anada .108 According to this 
in terpretation the provincial A ttorney-G eneral has exclusive control over 
the prosecution o f  Code offences, and both the federal and provincial 
A ttorneys-General can prosecute o ther federal act violations, the 
Parliam ent o f  C anada having explicitly recognized in the language o f s.
2 concurrency o f  federal and provincial powers for such prosecutions.
T his in terpretation o f s. 2 by Lajoie J.A. is not convincing. T he 
second part o f s. 2 can ju st as easily be read as constituting a blanket 
exception to the power given to the provincial A ttorneys-General in the 
opening  part o f the section. T his is the in terpretation counsel for the 
appellant adopted in Miller, and an exam ination o f  statem ents m ade by 
federal officials when the am endm ents to s. 2 were enacted apparently  
supports the latter app ro ach .109 These officials expressed the view that 
any control which the provinces exercised over prosecutions was given to 
them  by the federal governm ent pursuant to the criminal law power and 
had nothing to do  with the adm inistration o f justice in the province. 
T hey  did not see so fine a line between ss. 91(27) and 92(14) that the 
m atter o f  prosecutions could be considered as having both federal and 
provincial aspects so as to be com petent to both Parliam ent and the 
Legislatures.
T his federal govenm ent view, while questionable on constitutional 
grounds, is m ore realistic than the view’ o f the court in Miller. As 
Dickson J. com m ented in his dissent in Hauser:
>0*Supra, footnote 84. at 442-447.
101 Ibid., at 447.
"••Ibid., at 445.
l0tSupra, footnotes 9 and 10.
PROSECUTORIAL CONTROL IN CANADA 65
. . . the constitutional conflict engendered by s. 2(2) is too sharp and too 
complete to make this an appropriate case for an application o f  the “double 
aspect” doctrine. It is difficult to perceive in what “aspect” and for what 
“purpose” the two governments can differentiate their claims to jurisdiction.
Both claim jurisdiction over the powers o f  the attorney-general in criminal 
proceedings for the identical aspect and the identical purpose, namely, the 
prosecution and supervision o f  criminal offences.110
W hat we are faced with then in s. 2, is a problem  o f divided jurisdiction 
in criminal m atters (ss. 91(27) and 92(14)) and a single subject m atter 
(prosecutorial control). It is for the courts to resolve this problem  by 
a ttributing the subject m atter to one o r the o ther heads o f  power — 
w here the conflict is so obvious as in this case, the aspect doctrine should 
not be used to ignore the obvious jurisdictional question.
T h e  accepted view o f the aspect doctrine, as stated by the Privy 
Council in Hodge v. The Queen, 111 acknowledges “. . . that some kinds o f 
laws (have) both a federal and a provincial m atter . . . ” " 2 T he cases 
upholding the provincial offences o f  driving without du e  care and 
attention and the Code offences o f  dangerous driving are exam ples o f 
the use by the courts o f  this aspect doctrine. It is clear from  these cases 
that laws prescribing rules o f conduct on the roads have a “doube 
aspect” and are therefore, com petent to both Parliam ent and a 
Legislature. In o rd e r to fully understand  the doctrine one must ask 
when it can properly be applied to justify concurrency o f federal and 
provincial powers. T h e  answer is: when the conflict between the two 
aspects is not a sharp  o n e .113 If  the conflict is sharp, then the doctrine o f 
param ountcy would result in the federal power taking precedence over 
the provincial power.
A sharp  conflict between federal and provincial powers is raised by 
the com peting claims o f  the two levels o f  govenm ent to prosecutorial 
control. Since there can only be one Attorney-G eneral for each 
proceeding before the court, and since the effect o f  the param ountcy 
doctrine is to make provincial powers subservient to those o f the federal 
governm ent w here a conflict arises, the result would be, as described by 
Dickson J. in Hauser,
. . .  so far as the office o f  provincial attorney-general is concerned in relation 
to prosecution o f  criminal offences, the same as a declaration o f  exclusive 
federal power. . .  . Acceptance o f  the notion o f  concurrency would have the 
effect o f  removing from the provincial attorney-general the primary right and 
duty to prosecute in the province.114
>t0Supra, footnote 6, at 125.
‘"(1883), 9 A.C. 117, at 130.
" ’Hogg, P.W., Constitutional Law o f Canada, (1977), at 84. 
,IJM
l>4Sufna, footnote 6, at 126-127.
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T h erefo re , it seems that the provinces have as m uch to lose from  a 
“concurren t ju risd iction” solution to the problem s raised by s. 2 as they 
do by a Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada decision which gives a d irect answer 
to the question o f  which A ttorney-G eneral has prosecutorial control over 
crim inal offences. T he  latter approach would necessitate a characteriza­
tion by the court o f  s. 2; since strong argum ents can be m ade for a 
characterization o f the legislation u n d er s. 92(14),115 this approach 
would not automatically rem ove from  the provincial A ttorneys-General 
the prim ary right to prosecute in the province. Reliance on the doctrine 
o f  concurrency, on the o th er hand , because it would obviate 
characterization and because o f its relationship to the param ountcy 
principle, would take such prosecutorial control from  the provinces in 
the case o f  a conflict. T his would occur notw ithstanding the possibility 
that right which the provinces would be losing is perhaps, because o f s. 
92(14), one which is exlusively theirs and which should not be affected 
by any federal attem pt to legislate in the area. W etm ore J . expressed 
such a view’ in Kripps suggesting that co-operative federalism  is a better 
solution than concurrency to the type o f problem  presented  by the 
conflict between ss. 91(27) and 92(14), and stating that failing such a 
solution, . . the rem edy is in constitutional change, not in a judicial 
avoidance o f  powers clearly designated to the provinces.”116
Delegation
We saw in the exam ination o f the com m ittee discussions preceeding 
the am endm ent to s. 2 that the federal governm ent viewed any 
prosecutiorial power exercised by the provinces as delegation o f  federal 
authority  pursuan t to s. 91(27)1,7 This view is deficient in that it fails to 
take into consideration the possible inclusion w ithin s. 92(14) o f exclusive 
provincial pow er to prosecute crim inal offences and must be prem ised, 
therefore , on a definition o f  s. 91(27) which does not separate crim inal 
justice from  crim inal law and procedure.
T h e  principle stated by T aschereau J. in the N.S. Inter-Delegation 
case that . . the whole scheme o f the C anadian C onstitution would 
be entirely defeated . . .” if Parliam ent were to be perm itted to hand  
over any o f its prim ary legislative pow er,118 has been m odified by 
subsequent cases '19 so that delegation to provincial officials by 
Parliam ent is now perm itted. T h e  caveat to  this ability to delegate was
“ *See, e.g., Dnpps, Di lorio. Dickson J. dissenting in Hauser.
"*Supra, footnote 101, at 377.
"•[1950) 4 D.L.R. 369, at 382 (S.C.C.).
"•See especially P.E.I. Potalo Marketing Board v. H.B. Willis Inc. and the Attorney General o f Canada, [1952]
1,7Supra, footnote 11.
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stated in Hodge v. The Queen120 and re ferred  to by Estey J.A . in Pelletier, 
w herein he suggested that any delegation in s. 2 m ight . . be 
condem ned as a delegation o f authority  am ounting  to abdication . . . ”.121 
T h e  situation which exists pursuan t to a valid delegation is explained by 
Hogg as follows:
A delegation o f  power does not divest the delegator o f  its power; nor does it 
confer a permanent power on the delegate. The delegator Legislature has the 
continuing power to legislate on the same topic concurrently if it chooses and, 
more important, it can withdraw the delegation at any tim e.122
A pplying these principles to s. 2 we can conclude that if it is within the 
exclusive authority  o f  the Parliam ent o f  C anada, pursuant to the federal 
crim inal law power, to create crim es and to stipulate the procedure to  be 
followed in enforcing these crim es (which is not disputed), and if the 
pow er to prosecute those offences determ ined  to be crim es is 
inseparable from  the power to legislate in relation to criminal p rocedure 
(which is disputed) then the Parliam ent o f  C anada can delegate the 
enforcem ent power to the provincial A ttorneys-G eneral, as long as there 
is no abdiction. More im portant is the fact that having delegated the 
power, they can take it back when they choose to do so. T herefo re , if we 
accept the broad view o f s. 91(27), the am endm ent to s. 2 could be 
justified  as a reacquisition by the Parliam ent o f  C anada o f  pow er given 
them  by the B.N.A. Act which they had delegated to  provincial 
A ttorneys-General.
It has been suggested that s.. 91(27) and 92(14) are an exam ple o f 
inter-governm ental delegation being called for by the term s o f  the 
B.N.A. Act, such a delegation o f some federal power to the provinces 
being implicit in s. 92(14):
Accordingly, ever since 1867, provincial Attorneys-General . . . have adminis­
tered the federal Criminal Code in their respective Provinces. Moreover, most 
o f  the criminal trials under the Criminal Code o f  Canada are conducted by 
provincially-appointed magistrates who are given their authority in this respect 
by the procedural section o f  the Criminal Code o f  Canada.123
Im plicit in this argum ent are the assum ptions that s. 91(27) includes the 
enforcem ent o f  crim inal law and that the fram ers o f  the constitution 
created  simultaneously both s. 92(14) and a delegation o f some federal 
pow er pursuan t to s. 91(27). T h e re  is a conceptual problem  with the 
notion that provincial A ttorneys-General have been prosecuting in their 
respective provinces since 1867 because o f a constitutional im perative for
l,3Lederman, W.R., “Some Forms and Limitations o f Co-operative Federalism", (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 
409, at 425 (emphasis added).
lt0Supra, footnote 111.
,tlSupra. footnote 16, at 541.
IMHogj{, supra, footnote 112, at 224.
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the Parliam ent o f  C anada to delegate having been created by the 
co-existence o f ss. 91(27) and 92(14). Delegation implies that one level o f 
governm ent has power and allows officials o f  the o th er level to exercise 
that power. T h e  fram ers o f  the B.N.A. Act created both s. 91(27) and s. 
92(14), and  before we can decide if there is a valid delegation we have to 
decide the scope o f  these two heads o f power.
In com m enting on L ederm an’s analysis, LaForest has proposed what 
he considers to be the better view:
[t]he administration o f  justice includes the administration o f  criminal justice, 
b u t . .  . the federal Parliament can, in the exercise o f  its paramount power 
over criminal law. vest the administration o f  criminal law in persons other 
than provincial authorities.124
While this suggestion circum vents the conceptual problem  inherent in 
the form er analysis, it presents once m ore the difficulties re ferred  to in 
the discussions o f  concurrency and param ountcy, i.e., these doctrines 
m ake it unnecessary to define the relative scope o f ss. 91 (27) and 92(14) 
and they result in any conflict being resolved automatically in favour o f 
the federal governm ent.
In conclusion, before the nature o f  s. 2 as a delegation o f  federal 
power can be discussed it m ust first be decided w hether s. 92(14) 
em bodies the pow er to control crim inal prosecutions. If we accept the 
view’ that the crim inal law power is wide enough to enable the 
Parliam ent o f C anada to  delegate prosecutorial control to the provincial 
A ttorneys-General, then the delegation, given the various policy reasons 
favouring local control o f  crim inal prosecutions125 would be a welcome 
one. T h e  Di lorio decision cannot be forgotten however, and it is the 
em phasis placed by that ju d g m en t on the “elem ent o f  criminal justice” in 
s. 92(14) which makes the various judicial approaches to a solution o f 
the constitutional issues raised by s. 2 unsatisfactory.
THE CONSPIRACY CASES
In many o f the cases in which there was a challenge to the authority 
o f  the Parliam ent o f C anada to enact s. 2 the accused had been charged 
with conspiracy to violate a federal act contrary to s. 423 o f  the Criminal 
Code. 126 Since the A ttorney-G eneral o f  C anada conducted the 
prosecutions it would seem inevitable that the courts would be forced to 
decide which A ttorney-G eneral could properly control the prosecution
,,4LaF«rest. <i., “Delegation o f  Legislative Power in Canada”, (1975) 21 McGill L.J. 131, at 133.
l l iFor example, the greater accountability o f provincial Attorneys-General at the local level, and 
regional and local differences.
‘‘‘See, e.g., R. v. Pelletier, supra, footnote 16; R  v. Dunn (1977), 36 C.C.C. (2d) 495 (Sask C.A.), 
approved (1980). 52 C.C.C. (2d) 127 (S.C.C.); R  v. Aziz (1980). 4 C.R (3d) 299 (Que. C.A.).
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o f a criminal offence, the assum ption being that s. 423 creates such an 
offence by the very fact o f  its being enacted as part o f  the Criminal Code. 
We have seen, however, that the courts have often characterized 
im pugned legislation u n d er an alternative head o f power to s. 91(27) 
(e.g., the federal residual power) in spite o f the history and the case 
in terpretation o f  the legislation. W hat is surprising is the resort by the 
courts to such characterization when the offences in question have been 
Code offences, particularly ss. 115 and 423, thereby exposing to 
challenge som ething which seems self-evident: the criminal law basis o f  
Code offences.
T he  case o f R. x. A ziz ,121 argued before the Suprem e C ourt o f 
C anada in November, 1979, in which the issue was prosecutorial control 
over the Code offence o f conspiracy, m ight finally force the court to 
answer the question raised by s. 2 and left unanswered in Hauser and  in 
subsequent cases. T h e  question can be disposed o f  w ithout such a 
response if the court relies on the decisions in Parrot and Walden that 
an offence is not m ade crim inal in natu re merely because it is in the 
Criminal Code. 128 If on the o th er hand, the court accepts the contention 
o f  the provinces that the offence o f  conspiracy can only be characterized 
as criminal law, then the issue o f prosecutorial control o f  crim inal 
offences will have to be resolved.
A decision that s. 2 is intra vires might be given in the final 
disposition o f  the Aziz appeal if the precedent o f  R. v. Dunn is followed. 
In that case the court was faced with an appeal by the A ttorney-G eneral 
o f C anada from  an acquittal o f  the accused, who had been charged with 
conspiring to traffic in a narcotic. In upholding the constitutionality o f 
the power given to the Attorney-General by s. 2 to control the 
prosecution o f  a s. 423 conspiracy to breach a federal statute, the 
Saskatchewan C ourt o f  Appeal held that:
T he Crown in the right o f  Canada has an inherent right to prosecute offences
under federal statutes and neither the provisions o f  s. 92(14) nor s. 2 o f  the
Criminal Code are inconsistent with this right.129
T h e  C ourt o f  Appeal found strong authority  for its decision that the 
federal governm ent had such an inherent right o f  enforcem ent in R. v. 
Pelletier. T h e  charge in that case was also conspiracy to traffic in a 
narcotic and Estey J.A . relied upon the inherent executive authority  o f 
che federal governm ent to enforce its own laws as a justification for 
federal prosecutorial control concluding:
,,J(1978), 4 C.R. (3d) 299 (Que. C.A.).
'"S ee . for a reliance on Hauser and Parrot, the judgment o f Ksson |. in R. v. Pnne el al., (unreported). 
May 12. 1980 (B.C.S.C.).
’’•Su/ira, footnote 128, at 498.
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[t]hat there should be a right in the Attorney-General o f  Canada to enforce 
the Criminal Code as well as other federal criminal statutes does not appear to 
offend the theory underlying our constitutional law. . . .  130
O ne problem  with such an approach is that is ignores the clear language 
o f s. 2 which excludes the federal A ttorney-General from  Criminal Code 
prosecutions. A m ore serious defect is that it does nothing to solve the 
apparen t conundrum  created by the interface o f  ss. 91(27) and 92(14). 
While the inheren t executive authority  argum ent night be acceptable 
with reference to certain federal statutes, any federally enacted criminal 
statute m ust be subjected to close scrutiny in light o f  the right o f  the 
provinces to adm inister criminal justice. T his is what Dickson J . had in 
mind when he com m ented on the inherent executive authority 
argum ent as follows:
A different situation obtains with respect to s. 91(27) and s. 92(14) because o f  
the specific conferral upon the provinces o f  the right and responsibility to 
administer justice, particularly criminal justice. The quarrel here is not over 
the right o f  Parliament to enforce its own enactments, but rather, and this 
bears repeated emphasis, the attempt by Parliament to exclude the provinces 
from the right to supervise criminal prosecutions.131
While Estey J.A. did not address him self to the issue o f  legislative 
com petence over the prosecution o f  criminal offences when discussing 
the inheren t executive authority  o f  the federal governm ent, he did 
recognize the existence o f the problem  as described by Dickson J. Such a 
recognition is evident in his com m ents about concurrency: “. . . s. 2(2) 
does not p u rp o rt to grant exclusivity . . . and thus the most difficult 
potential issue is d eferred  to ano ther day and another court.”132 T he 
problem  is: for how long can this issue be deferred?
T h e  conspiracy cases and their com m ents on s. 2 are yet ano ther 
exam ple o f  the need for the courts to define s. 92(14) if the 
constitutional validity o f s. 2 is to be clarified. We can hope that such a 
clarification will be provided by the decision in R. v. Aziz.
CONCLUSION
T h ere  is no doubt that the problem s created by the definition o f 
A ttorney-G eneral in the Criminal Code have been exacerbated by the 
issue-avoidance approach the courts seem to have taken to most o f  
the s. 2 challenges. T he  overlap which characterizes the relationship 
between ss. 91(27) and 92(14), when com bined with a lack o f case law 
in terp re ting  the latter section, has apparently  obstructed a satisfactory
'30Supra, footnote 16, at 542-543.
,3'Sufna. footnote 6, at 123.
'3*Supra, footnote 16, at 541 (emphasis added).
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analysis o f  the constitutional validity o f s. 2. T h e  most desirable solution 
to the issue would be an in terpretation by the Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada 
o f  s. 92(14) and o f the authority, if any, which that section gives to the 
provincial A ttorneys-General to exercise prosecutorial control.
While concurrency is in some respects an attractive solution in that 
it is expedient, such an approach would be superficial and undesirable 
because it would subvert w hatever p rosecu to ria l ju risd ic tio n  is 
com prehended  by s. 92(14) without the scope o f that head o f power 
having ever been articulated.
T h ere  are persuasive policy reasons for giving the federal 
A ttorney-General a greater degree o f  control over prosecutions than was 
enjoyed prio r to 1969. It is true  that some crime is becoming 
increasingly national and international in scope and is beyond the 
capabilities o f local enforcem ent. These reasons are not determ inative 
however, fo r it is also true that much crim e is still local in natu re and 
that provincial A ttorneys-General are m ore accountable within their 
respective provinces for the m anner in which prosecutions are carried 
out than federal officials are o r could hope to be.
it  has been argued  by the proponents o f  increased federal 
prosecutorial control that it would be against the basic concept o f  
federalism  to give to the provinces control o f  the prosecution o f any 
federally enacted offence, the rationale being that each legislature 
should have the authority  to enforce its own laws. O ne o f  the basic 
principles o f  ou r federal system is the distribution o f  powers in the 
constitution; it would equally be an affront to the concept o f  federalism 
if we were to ignore the significance o f  this distribution.
It may be that s. 2 is poorly d rafted , since the distinction between 
Code and non-Code offences in that section, as opposed to a contrast 
between crim inal and non-criminal offences, is not one which makes the 
relationship o f  ss. 91(27) and 92(14) easy to discern. Regardless o f  the 
way the definition o f  A ttorney-General is d rafted , the conclusion is that 
both the independent existence o f s. 92(14) and the history o f  
prosecutorial control indicate that prosecution o f criminal offences lies 
within exclusive provincial authority. If  there are policy reasons which 
justify increased federal authority  for certain prosecutions, then these 
should be worked out by the two levels o f  governm ent. It is suggested 
that any such co-operative attem pt ought to begin with the following 
question: do we need a dual prosecutorial system in C anada and, if so, 
to what extent should the federal Attorney-General exercise a role?
We will always come back, however, to the question o f  the 
distribution o f pow ers in the constitution. T he  response o f  C anadian 
courts to this question has been discouraging and has not contributed  to 
a solution o f the problem s created by the increased role the federal 
Attorney-General has assum ed in the control o f  the prosecution process.
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ADDENDUM
Since this m anuscript appeared  in proof, the decision o f  the Suprem e 
C ourt o f C anada in R. v. Aziz became available (27 January  1981). It 
was thought that this decision m ight finally provide an answer to the 
question o f  which A ttorney-G eneral has prosecutorial control over 
crim inal offences. Such as answer was not forthcom ing. T he C ourt 
chose instead to look behind the actual crim inal conspiracy charge to 
the natu re  o f  the unlawful act to which the conspiracy related. T hat 
act was the im portation o f narcotics, a subject within the legislative 
com petence o f  the Parliam ent o f Canada. In unanim ously holding 
that the federal A ttorney-G eneral had the authority to control the 
prosecution o f  a conspiracy to violate the Narcotic Control Act, 133 the 
C ourt stated that such prosecutorial control was necessarily incidental 
to the power to enforce the federal statute. T h e  existence o f  conspiracy 
as a distinct criminal offence appears not to have been a factor in the 
decision, as part o f  the Narcotic Control Act, a section giving the federal 
A ttorney-G eneral the control o f a prosecution for a conspiracy to violate 
that statute. T he C ourt affirm ed the decision in Hauser, and no com m ent 
was m ade on the desirability o f  a dual prosecutorial system in Canada.
It seems, therefore , that Aziz neither clarified the relationship 
between ss. 91(27) and 92(14), nor does it assist us in determ ining which 
A ttorney-G eneral has prosecutorial control over criminal offences.
'3*Supra, footnote 68.
